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Splitting Hairs: The Eleventh Circuit’s
Take on Workplace Bans Against Black
Women’s Natural Hair in EEOC v.
Catastrophe Management Solutions
D. WENDY GREENE*
What does hair have to do with African descendant
women’s employment opportunities in the 21st century? In
this Article, Professor Greene demonstrates that Black
women’s natural hair, though irrelevant to their ability to
perform their jobs, constitutes a real and significant barrier
to Black women’s acquisition and maintenance of employment as well as their enjoyment of equality, inclusion, and
dignity in contemporary workplaces. For nearly half a century, the federal judiciary has played a pivotal role in establishing and preserving this status quo. The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeal’s recent decision in EEOC v. Catastrophe
Management Solutions exacerbates what Professor Greene
calls employers’ “hyper-regulation of Black women’s bodies via their hair.” This Article considers how federal courts
and namely the Eleventh Circuit have issued hair splitting
*

Visiting Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law; Professor
of Law, Cumberland School of Law at Samford University. As always, I am especially grateful for the unwavering support and encouragement of my family and
friends; special thanks to my sister, Colonel Kimberly Greene (USAF, Retired),
and my niece, Morgan Parker Pettihome, for their cheerful assistance and genuine
engagement with this article. For their tremendous support of this work, I would
also like to thank Professor Deleso Alford, Professor Charlton Copeland, Professor Kristin Johnson, Professor Trina Jones, the late Adrian Rashid, Professor Jessica Roberts, and Professor Angela Onwuachi-Willig. Lastly, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the editorial staff of the Eleventh Circuit Issue
and Sharidan Hollis, J.D., for her research assistance.
987

988

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:987

decisions in race-based “grooming codes discrimination
cases” that decree: federal anti-discrimination law protects
African descendants when they are discriminated against for
adorning afros but statutory protection ceases once they
grow their naturally textured or curly hair long or don it in
braids, twists, or locks. Professor Greene explains that
courts’ strict application of a “legal fiction” known as the
immutability doctrine—and the biological notion of race
that informs it—have greatly contributed to this incoherency
in anti-discrimination law, which triggers troubling, tangible consequences in the lives of Black women.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2010—like many if not most job seekers—Chastity Jones, an
African American woman, searched online for employment.1 Ms.
Jones submitted a job application with Catastrophe Management Solutions (“CMS”), a company based in Mobile, Alabama that provides customer service support to insurance companies’ claims processing.2 She applied for a Customer Service Representative position, which required handling customer inquiries via telephone and
basic computer knowledge.3 Along with thirty other applicants,
CMS invited her to interview for the position.4 Jones wore a blue
business suit, black pumps, and her hair in locks to the interview.5
After an initial assessment of the required skills, CMS extended a
job offer to Ms. Jones.6 Jones then met privately with CMS’ human
resources manager, Jeannie Wilson, to reschedule required lab
tests.7 As Ms. Jones departed the meeting, Ms. Wilson asked her if
she was donning “dreadlocks,” to which Jones replied in the affirmative.8 Ms. Wilson informed Jones that she could no longer hire her
if she continued to wear locks, explaining “they tend to get messy,
although I’m not saying yours are, but you know what I am talking
about.”9 Ms. Wilson added that previously an African American
male applicant was asked to cut off his locks to secure a position
with CMS.10 Ms. Jones refused this condition of employment, returned her initial paper work to Ms. Wilson, and left the building.11

1

EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, No. 14-13482, 2016 WL 7210059,
at *1 (11th Cir. Dec. 13, 2016).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id. at *2.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.

990

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:987

Regrettably, Ms. Jones’ encounter with grooming codes discrimination12 at the intersection of race and gender13 is not an isolated incidence.14 Countless employers have instructed African descendant15 women to cut off, cover, or alter their naturally textured
hair in order to obtain and maintain employment for which they are
qualified.16 Like Ms. Jones, other African descendant women have
endured a barrage of offensive, stereotypical perceptions, denigrating their naturally textured hair as “messy,” “unkempt,” “dirty,” and
“unprofessional,” not only during the hiring process, but also during

“Grooming codes discrimination” is a term that I developed to describe the
specific form of inequality and infringement upon one’s personhood resulting
from the enactment and enforcement of formal as well as informal appearance and
grooming mandates, which bear no relationship to one’s job qualifications and
performance. However, such mandates implicate protected categories under antidiscrimination law like race, color, age, disability, sex, and/or religion.
13
For the seminal article on intersectional claims of discrimination involving
Black women, see Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race
and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) [hereinafter Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex].
14
See Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 2016 WL 7210059 at *11 (citing ten
cases from various courts where grooming policies were at issue).
15
This Article will use African descendant, African American, and Black interchangeably to describe individuals who identify as having African ancestry.
Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw has explained that “Black” deserves—– capitalization because “Blacks, like Asians [and] Latinos. . . constitute a specific cultural
group and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun.” Kimberlé Williams
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) [hereinafter
Race, Reform, and Retrenchment] (citing Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism,
Marxism, Method and State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 516 (1982)).
Additionally, Professor Neil Gotanda contends that the capitalization of Black is
appropriate since it “has deep political and social meaning as a liberating term.”
Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV.
1, 4 n.12 (1991). I agree with both Professors Crenshaw and Gotanda and for both
reasons throughout this article when I reference people of African descent individually and collectively the word, Black, will be represented as a proper noun.
However, I maintain the preference of authors to whom I cite directly as it pertains
to their reference of particular racial groups with proper nouns.
16
See Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, WL 7210059 at *11 (citing ten cases
where grooming policies were the basis for dismissal).
12
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the course of their employment.17 As a result, in lieu of donning
twists, locks, braids, or afros, many African descendant women don
straightened hairstyles to avoid the stigmatization of their natural
hair, which often engenders harassment, unfavorable performance
evaluations, as well as loss or denial of employment.18 Notably, federal courts have not treated these instances of grooming codes discrimination, uniquely and commonly affecting African descendant
women,19 as unlawful race and/or gender discrimination under federal law—except when employers regulate or ban afros adorned by
African descendant women.20
This Article explores the origins and the most recent judicial reaffirmation of this hair-splitting distinction between permissible and
impermissible regulation of natural hairstyles under federal anti-discrimination law. In Part II, this Article briefly discusses the federal
anti-discrimination laws that African descendant women have utilized to challenge the legality of natural hair bans in the workplace.
Part II also examines the seminal case, Rogers v. American Airlines,
wherein private employers were essentially afforded an unfettered
right to regulate and proscribe natural hairstyles adorned by African
descendant women except afros.21 Part III details the litigation history of the most recent federal case of grooming codes discrimination against natural hairstyles, Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) v. Catastrophe Management Solutions.
Both the federal district court and the Eleventh Circuit in EEOC v.
Catastrophe Management Solutions strictly applied the immutability doctrine to hold that CMS’ prohibition against Ms. Jones’ locks
In 2014, the United States Army re-issued Regulation 670-1, “Wear and
Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia”: a grooming regulation that expressly barred servicewomen from donning two-strand twists and locks as well as
severely regulated the width of braids namely cornrows. Maya Rhodan, U.S. Military Rolls Back Restrictions on Black Hairstyles, TIME: POLITICS (Aug. 13,
2014), http://time.com/3107647/military-black-hairstyles/. The Army’s grooming
policy described these ways in which African American service women commonly wear their natural hair in derogatory terms—as “matted and unkempt.” Id.
18
D. Wendy Greene, Black Women Can’t Have Blonde Hair. . . in the Workplace, 14 J. GEN. RACE & JUST. 405, 405–06 (2011) [hereinafter Black Women
Can’t Have Blonde Hair].
19
Id. at 406–07.
20
Rogers v. Am. Airlines Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
21
Id. at 231–33.
17
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did not constitute unlawful race discrimination under Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Per the courts, Title VII’s protections
against race discrimination only extend to covered employers’ regulation of immutable characteristics— characteristics with which
one is born, are fixed, difficult to change, and/or displayed by all
individuals who share the same racial identity. This Article argues
that the immutability doctrine, namely strict immutability, is a “legal
fiction”: a judicially created rule which is not based in fact yet is
treated as such in legitimizing zones of legal protection and inclusion. Guided by this legal fiction, the Eleventh Circuit in EEOC v.
Catastrophe Management Solutions fortified the lawful deprivation
of not only employment opportunities for which African descendant
women are qualified but also equal terms, privileges, and conditions
of employment when they grow their naturally textured hair long or
when it simply does not fit the mold of an afro.22 In so doing, the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision sanctions the “hyper-regulation” of
Black women’s bodies via their hair in contemporary American
workplaces.23
I. TWISTED COVERAGE: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL
ANTIDISCRIMINATION STATUTES AND ROGERS V. AMERICAN AIRLINES
A. Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation: Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act and Section 1981 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act
No federal law specifically governs appearance discrimination
and only a few jurisdictions prohibit workplace discrimination on
the basis of appearance.24 Consequently, Black women contesting
employers’ formal or informal hair regulations have brought race
and/or sex discrimination claims under federal anti-discrimination
laws—namely Section 1981 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act and Title

22
Per federal precedent, employers are also able to prohibit or regulate the
donning of wigs or hair extensions shaped in the form of twists, braids, or locks
that are made from synthetic or natural hair. See, e.g., Rogers, 527 F. Supp. At
231–32 (holding that an employer can lawfully prohibit an African descendant
woman from donning cornrow braids).
23
EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, No. 14-13482, 2016 WL 7210059,
at *1–14 (11th Cir. Dec. 13, 2016).
24
See, e.g., Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2202
(2015).
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VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act—or state analogues.25 Section
1981, a Reconstruction-era statutory provision, provides that all individuals possess the same right to “make and enforce contracts. . .
as is enjoyed by white citizens.”26 Courts have interpreted Section
1981 to prohibit intentional race27 and color28 discrimination in the
employment context.29 Over a century later, with the enactment of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Congress promulgated a more express
and expansive proscription against workplace discrimination on the
basis of race, color, sex, religion, and national origin.30 The substantive provisions of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act make it
unlawful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his

25

See Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, WL 7210059 at *11; see also Johnson
v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc. 421 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1975).
26
42 U.S.C § 1981(a) (2012). The Supreme Court has interpreted this statutory language as a prohibition against intentional race discrimination in private
employment. See Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459–60.
27
See Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459–60.
28
See e.g., Jordan v. Whelan Sec. of Illinois, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 3d 746, 753
(N.D. Ill. 2014) (recognizing Section 1981 encompasses employment discrimination claims on the basis of color).
29
Courts have held that Section 1981 does not permit independent claims of
national origin discrimination; however, due to the often indistinguishable nature
between these bases of discrimination, courts may allow national origin discrimination claims to proceed when the evidence supports a claim of race discrimination. See Short v. Mando Am. Corp., 805 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1267–68 (M.D. Ala.
2011).
30
See 42 U.S.C. §2000e–2 (2012).
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status as an employee, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.31
Federal anti-discrimination laws also protect current, former,32
and prospective employees who suffer retaliation for opposing an
unlawful employment practice or participating in an investigation
related to unlawful discrimination.33 The United States Supreme
Court has interpreted Title VII to prohibit intentional discrimination—employment decisions that are consciously motivated by animus,34 stereotypes,35 and mere consideration of a protected classification36—as well as unintentional discrimination.37 In grooming
codes discrimination cases challenging express policies that mandate different grooming or dress requirements for men and women,
31

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2012). Specifically, Title VII prohibits an
employer from retaliating “against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted,
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012). See CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 445 (2008) (holding that retaliation claims are actionable
under Section 1981).
32
See e.g., Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506, 1509–10 (11th Cir. 1988)
(holding that former employees have standing to bring Title VII retaliation claims
though the plain language does expressly contemplates current and prospective
employees).
33
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
34
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); see
also Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 422 (2011).
35
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 256–58 (1989).
36
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 592–93 (2009) (holding that municipal
government’s consideration of race in its decision not to certify promotional exam
results, which disproportionately impacted African American firefighters and thus
resulted in a negative employment decision for white male firefighters and a Hispanic male firefighter, constitutes intentional race discrimination under Title VII).
37
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (adopting a disparate
impact theory of discrimination in Title VII cases to redress “not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation”). In 1991, Congress codified the disparate theory of liability whereby the
plaintiff can recover if she demonstrates that: (1) a facially neutral employment
practice causes a disproportionate impact on individuals who share the same religion, color, national origin, race, or sex; and (2) the covered employer fails to
adopt a less discriminatory alternative that is job related and meets the employer’s
business needs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)–(C) (2012).
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federal courts have treated such requirements—when they impose
undue burdens upon women or men—as intentional sex discrimination, unless the employer can produce persuasive evidence that an
employee’s conformity with the gender-based grooming or dress
standard is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the operation of the employer’s business.38
Black women have contended employers’ regulation of their
natural hair constitutes a form of race discrimination or discrimination at the intersection of race and gender39 in violation of Section
1981 and/or Title VII.40 However, almost uniformly, federal courts
have decided that their cases of grooming codes discrimination are
not actionable.41 A primary reason for federal courts’ non-recognition of their race discrimination claims is a judicial understanding of
race as an immutable characteristic: an identity trait that is fixed or
difficult to change and/or with which one is born and is marked by

38
Where an employment practice makes terms and conditions of employment expressly on the basis of sex, religion, or national origin, Title VII provides
a statutory affirmative defense: the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
(“BFOQ”) defense. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2012). In narrow circumstances,
a covered employer can escape Title VII liability for intentional sex, religion, or
national origin discrimination if the employer can produce persuasive evidence
that the challenged employment practice is a “bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business.” Id. According to the Supreme Court, the employer must demonstrate that the facially
discriminatory employment requirement concerns job-related skills and aptitudes
based upon objectively verifiable evidence rather than “general subjective standards.” Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am.,
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200–201 (1991).
39
See Jefferies v. Harris Cnty. Community Assn., 615 F.2d 1025 (5 th Cir.
1980) (holding that Title VII permits discrimination claims on the basis of multiple impermissible characteristics and thus, a Black woman could pursue her claim
that she was discriminated against because of both her race and gender).
40
D. Wendy Greene, A Multidimensional Analysis of What Not to Wear in
the Workplace: Hijabs and Natural Hair, 8 FIU L. REV. 331, 336 (2013) [hereinafter What Not to Wear in the Workplace].
41
In her groundbreaking work, Professor Crenshaw attributes the failure of
Black women’s intersectional claims of discrimination to courts viewing their experience along a “single-axis analysis” that distorts the “multidimensionality of
Black women’s experiences.” Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex,
supra note 13, at 139.
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features that all or only individuals who share a racial identity possess.42 As explained in the following sections, this concept of immutability advanced in Rogers v. American Airlines and EEOC v.
Catastrophe Management Solutions is a “legal fiction” that is rooted
in a discredited view of race as biological and unchangeable.43
B. Rogers v. American Airlines
Shortly after Title VII was enacted, discrimination cases contesting the legality of employment policies controlling the ways
42

See e.g., Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(holding that an employer’s regulation of a Black female employee’s cornrow
braids did not violate Title VII because braids are not an “immutable characteristic”). Significantly, not all arbiters of race-based grooming discrimination cases
have applied the immutability doctrine in analyzing whether a policy banning African descendants’ braided hair constitutes unlawful race discrimination. See Chicago Commission on Human Relations in the matters of Scott v. Owner of Club
720 and Lyke v. Owner of Club 720 (February 16, 2011) (finding that a Chicago
night club’s ban against braids adorned by African descendant men violated the
Chicago Human Rights Ordinance’s prohibitions against race discrimination in
part because the night club “disfavored a hairstyle associated with one racial
group based on stereotypical assumptions about wearers of the hairstyle, imposing
an additional burden on that group in order to enjoy the full use of the public
accommodations it offered”). Opinion located here: https://www.cityofchicago.
org/content/dam/city/depts/cchr/DataPortalDocs/09P002Feb162011.pdf
43
See D. Wendy Greene, Categorically Black, White, or Wrong: “Misperception Discrimination” and the State of Title VII Protection, 47 U. MICH. J. L.
REF. 87, 134 (2013) [hereinafter Categorically Black, White, or Wrong] (positing
that our understanding of racial identity is influenced by broader social, political,
legal, and economic forces, as well as specific personal experiences). A recently
filed Title VII race discrimination claim frustrates the contention that racial identity is unchangeable. All of his life, police sergeant Cleon Brown self-identified
as white; however, Brown claimed that after receiving the results of an Ancestry.com test, which reported that he was 18 percent African descendant, he began
to identify as African-American. Brown alleged that he became the target of racially derogatory treatment after he shared the results of the Ancestry.com test
with his colleagues and supervisors. https://cbsdetroit.files.wordpress.com/2017/
05/2017-04-11-brown-cleon-ecf-001-plaintiffs-complaint-and-jury-demand.pdf.
This case presses the court to contemplate similar, important queries posed in
EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions. For example: 1) what is race—is it
a biological or social construct; 2) should Title VII’s definition of race be informed by historic or contemporary understandings of race; and 3) is statutory
protection contingent upon the alleged discrimination related to an impermissible
classification or the identity trait of the plaintiff?
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Black women wore their natural hair surfaced.44 For example, Black
women argued that formal and informal mandates to change their
afros or “bushy” hair as a condition of employment constituted unlawful race discrimination. Both the EEOC and federal courts
treated such regulations as violative of Title VII’s substantive language.45 Yet, it was the 1981 decision in Rogers v. American Airlines that came to define the contours of race-based challenges
against grooming codes discrimination in the workplace.46
A year after becoming a customer service agent, Renee Rodgers,
an eleven-year American Airlines employee, wore her hair in cornrows.47 In turn, American Airlines implemented a grooming policy
that banned employees in customer service positions from wearing
braided hairstyles.48 Rodgers argued that American Airlines’
grooming regulation constituted race and sex discrimination in violation of Title VII and other civil rights laws.49 Through her contention that American Airlines’ policy uniquely discriminated against
her and other Black women, she raised an intersectional claim of

44

See, e.g., Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 168
(7 Cir. 1976). In Jenkins, the plaintiff asserted a Title VII race discrimination
claim because her supervisor informed her that she “could never represent Blue
Cross with [her] Afro.” Id. at 167. The court held that the supervisor’s lone statement was sufficient to support a race discrimination claim because “[a] lay person’s description of racial discrimination could hardly be more explicit. The reference to the Afro hairstyle was merely the method by which the plaintiff’s supervisor allegedly expressed the employer’s racial discrimination.” Id. at 168.
45
Id. But see Carswell v. Peachford Hosp., No. C80-222A, 1981 WL 224, at
*2 (N.D. Ga. May 26, 1981) (holding that a Black woman’s discipline and subsequent termination for refusing to remove beads from her braids did not amount to
a facially discriminatory policy on the basis of race in part because “the wearing
of beads in one’s hair is [not] an immutable characteristic, such as national origin,
race, or sex”).
46
See Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231–32.
47
Professor Paulette Caldwell reveals in her scholarly examination of the
case that the accurate spelling of the plaintiff’s last name is Rodgers though the
official case name spells it Rogers. See Paulette M. Caldwell, Intersectional Bias
and the Courts: The Story of Rogers v. Am. Airlines, in RACE LAW STORIES 571,
575 n.12 (Devon W. Carbado & Rachel F. Moran eds., 2008) [hereinafter Intersectional Bias and the Courts].
48
See id. at 576.
49
See Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231.
th
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discrimination.50 Rodgers explained that cornrows were “historically, a fashion and style adopted by Black American women, reflective of cultural, historical essence of Black women in American
society.”51 To Rodgers, American Airlines’ braids ban implicated
the same “racial dynamics” as an employer’s prohibition against afros and thus should likewise be deemed an act of unlawful race discrimination.52 The court concurred that if American Airlines enacted
a ban against afros such a policy would likely violate Title VII.
However, it did not apply this reasoning to American Airlines’ no
braids policy.
The Rogers court grounded its distinguishable legal treatment of
cornrows and afros in the immutability doctrine. It pronounced that
federal protections against race discrimination only extend to a covered employer’s regulation of or adverse treatment based upon immutable traits: traits with which one is born, are fixed, difficult to
change, and/or displayed by individuals who share the same racial
identity.53 Therefore, an actionable claim of race discrimination necessitated evidence that African descendants exclusively or predominantly adorned braids.54 By articulating this evidentiary standard, it
appears that the Rogers court presumed that a workplace prohibition
against afros constituted a form of race discrimination because African descendants predominantly or exclusively don or are born with
an afro. However, as it pertained to American Airlines’ regulation
of braids, the court reasoned that Rodgers was unable to satisfy this
essentialist (and essentially impossible) prima facie requirement
since Bo Derrek, a white actress, donned cornrows in the movie
“10.”55 Despite the long history of African descendant women wearing braids as a matter of course, the court implied that Bo Derrek
popularized cornrows, thereby devaluing Ms. Rodgers’ claim that
for Black women, cornrows are imbued with deep cultural and personal meaning.56 The court effectively concluded that since a white
woman braided her hair, donning cornrows could in no way inform
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Intersectional Bias and the Courts, supra note 47, at 573.
See Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231–32.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 232.
See id.
See id.
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Ms. Rodgers’ understanding of herself as a Black woman. In essence, the judge dictated to Ms. Rodgers which of her individual
characteristics he believed were consequential to her personhood as
a Black woman, usurping the autonomy, freedom, and dignity embodied in defining her identity based upon her lived experience.57
To add insult to injury, the court characterized Ms. Rodgers’ cornrow braids, which were the result of synthetic hair extensions, as an
“easily changeable artifice.”58 In so doing, the Rogers court suggested American Airlines’ regulation of Ms. Rodgers’ hair did not
implicate Title VII’s proscriptions against race discrimination because her cornrows were not natural since they were not an inevitable physical feature of African ancestry.59 Rather, Ms. Rodgers’
braids were a mutable, stylistic choice which she could easily
change unlike an “immutable racial” characteristic presumably like
her skin color or an afro.60 Thus, the Rogers court opined that American Airlines’ no braids policy had “at most a negligible effect on
employment opportunity” and concerned “a matter of relatively low
importance in terms of the constitutional interests protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII.”61
It is important to note that the court erred in assuming that all,
most, or only people who identify as African descendants have
adorned, or can adorn, an afro. Not all or only individuals of African
descent possess hair texture that can be shaped into an afro. Indeed,
the hair texture and hairstyles among African descendant women
specifically, and African descendant people generally, are diverse
and infinite. In A Multidimensional Analysis of What Not to Wear:
Hijabs and Natural Hair, I explained:
57

The Rogers court is not alone; relying upon Rogers and subsequent legal
precedent, the federal district court in EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions rejected the EEOC’s argument that Ms. Jones’ naturally locked hair is a defining characteristic of her identification as a Black woman. See EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, No. 14-13482, 2016 WL 7210059, at *9–11 (11th Cir.
Dec. 13, 2016).
58
See Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232.
59
Intersectional Bias and the Courts, supra note 47, at 580.
60
See Rogers¸ 527 F. Supp. at 232. The court explained that American Airlines’ regulation of Ms. Rodgers’ braids did not violate Title VII because it did
not “regulate on the basis of any immutable characteristic of the employees involved.” Id. at 231.
61
Id. at 231.
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not all Black women wear natural hairstyles, and for
those Black women who do, the reasons are likewise
varied and are not mutually exclusive. Black women
may wear a natural hairstyle to minimize or eliminate
the physical and financial inconveniences that come
along with wearing straightened hairstyles. Black
women may wear their hair naturally for aesthetic
reasons, as a form of racial/ethnic expression, and/or
to challenge pervasive expectations and pressures to
wear a straightened hairstyle as an implicit petition
for genuine inclusion, respect, and equal treatment.
Finally, Black women donning natural hairstyles are
also simply wearing their hair the way in which it
grows on their heads—with or without any motive or
meaning. Thus, like hijabs for some Muslim women,
donning natural hairstyles for some Black women is
a defining feature of their identity and personhood.62
The reasons for donning natural hairstyles and the processes by
which Black women achieve them are also varied and often times
more complicated than what meets the eye.63 The court may have
inaccurately concluded that braids are an easily changeable characteristic based upon a lack of knowledge about the process of braiding and removing braids, especially those that are created with hair
extensions. A lack of understanding may also explain the court’s
view of Ms. Rodgers’ braided hair as a simple aesthetic choice rather
than a matter which can be simultaneously complex, deeply personal, and organic.64 The court’s miseducation about African descendant women’s hair produced a powerful legal precedent—one
that accorded employers essentially limitless freedom, authority,
and privilege to stigmatize, exclude, and marginalize African descendant women in the workplace because of their hair.
For nearly fifty years, U.S. federal courts have adjudicated a variety of legal challenges against employers’ formal and informal
regulation of Black women’s hair. Since the 1970s, Black women
62

Id.
What Not to Wear in the Workplace, supra note 40, at 358–59.
64
See Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232 (suggesting that Ms. Rodgers donned the
all-braided hairstyle in response to the popularity of the film “10”).
63
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have opposed workplace prohibitions against their adornment of
synthetic braids,65 twists,66 locks,67 cornrows with beads,68 straightened blonde hair,69 locked blonde hair,70 finger waves71, and ponytails72. The breadth of litigation exposes not only the diversity of
Black women’s hair but also the hyper-regulation of Black women’s
bodies in the workplace via their hair. Indeed, one employer sought
to restrain a Black woman’s agency and desire to wear her hair differently by requiring her to seek supervisory approval before she
changed her hair but did not impose the same mandates on white
female employees.73 Other employers have directed or advised
Black women to change their hair or hair color until their appearance
satisfies a supervisor’s subjective standards of acceptability and
beauty.74 Employers have also publicly stigmatized Black women’s
hair and placed Black women in a humiliating Catch-22: either
cover,75 alter,76 or cut off your hair altogether or be deprived of current or prospective employment. Black women’s hair has also colored supervisors’ perceptions of their job performance, resulting in

65

Rogers v. American Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Pitts v. Wild Adventures, No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306 (M.D.
Ga. Apr. 25, 2008).
67
EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions, Inc., 2016 WL 7210059.
68
Carswell v. Peachford Hosp., No. C80-222A, 1981 WL 224, at *1 (N.D.
Ga. May 26, 1981).
69
See D. Wendy Greene, Black Women Can’t Have Blonde Hair . . . in the
Workplace, 14 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 405 (2011) [herinafter Black Women
Can’t Have Blonde Hair].
70
EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions, Inc., 2016 WL 7210059.
71
Hollins v. Atl. Co., 188 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 1999).
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
See generally, Pitts v. Wild Adventures, No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL
1899306 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 25, 2008).
75
Pitts v. Wild Adventures, No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306 (M.D.
Ga. Apr. 25, 2008); Burchette v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 08 Civ.
8786, 2009 WL 856682 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2009).
76
Rogers v. American Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Pitts v.
Wild Adventures, No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 25,
2008; Burchette v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 8786, 2009 WL
856682 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2009).
66
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decreased compensation,77 discipline,78 and termination79 often accompanied by demoralizing and subordinating judgments about
their professionalism and femininity as well as the judiciousness of
their personal grooming choices.
For example, in Pitts v. Wild Adventures, Patricia Pitts alleged
that when she reported to work with her hair in cornrows, her supervisor expressed disapproval and offered an unsolicited “suggestion”
that she change her hair into a “pretty” style.80 Despite the cost and
time involved, Ms. Pitts attempted to comply with the supervisor’s
“recommendation” while also donning her natural hair presumably
in a way Ms. Pitts found attractive. In lieu of cornrows, Ms. Pitts
returned to work donning two-strand twists.81 Her supervisor again
disapproved because she felt Ms. Pitts’ two-strand twists too closely
resembled locks.82 Ms. Pitts refused to expend additional cost and
time to restyle her hair since Wild Adventures did not have formal
grooming policy in place. Furthermore, in no way was Ms. Pitts’
hair relevant to her job performance. Within days, however, Wild
Adventures disseminated a written policy that banned “dreadlocks,
cornrows, beads, and shells” unless they were covered by a hat or
visor.83 Effectively, Ms. Pitts and other Black employees84 could
77

Hollins v. Atl. Co., 188 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 1999).
In March 2015, a Black woman who worked as a restaurant hostess for a
Canadian franchise reported that management publicly reprimanded her when she
began wearing her hair in braids, calling her hair unacceptable, instructing her to
go home, and subsequently denying her shifts because they did not “want that
kind of look . . . at the restaurant.” The former hostess filed a race discrimination
complaint against the restaurant with the Quebec Human Rights Commission,
which is the first of its kind. http://www.diversityinc.com/news/hairstyles-ofblack-women-cases-of-discrimination/.
79
See, e.g., id. See also Bryant v. BEGIN Manage Program, 281 F. Supp. 2d
561 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); Burchette v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 08 Civ.
8786, 2009 WL 856682 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2009).
80
Pitts, No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306 at *1 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 25,
2008).
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
It is important to note that Black women are not singularly affected by
grooming policies regulating natural hairstyles. Black men have also challenged
these policies on the ground that they are racially discriminatory. See Eatman v.
United Parcel Serv., 194 F. Supp. 2d 256, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). For a more detailed discussion of the Eatman case, D. Wendy Greene, Title VII: What’s Hair
78
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neither wear their natural hair freely nor freely make choices about
their natural hair. Like Renee Rodgers, Patricia Pitts challenged
Wild Adventures’ hyper-regulation of her natural hair as a form of
race discrimination.85 And like Renee Rodgers, Patricia Pitts’ race
discrimination claim was rejected by the court.86 Citing to Rogers,
the Pitts court legalized an employer’s hyper-regulation of a Black
woman’s natural hair when not shaped like an afro based upon subjective and paternalistic ideals about what management finds “attractive,” “acceptable,” and therefore “permissible” in the workplace.
Also like Pitts, the Rogers court made invisible the burdens and
attendant injury Ms. Rodgers, and countless African descendant
women like her, suffer as a consequence of the hyper-regulation of
their bodies via their hair. As I explained in earlier work:
[The Rogers] court could not concede the particular
stigmatization and offense that Renee Rodgers, as a
Black woman, would experience when American
Airlines instructed that: as a customer service representative, her donning cornrows was specifically
prohibited because it did not reflect the “conservative
and business-like image” that American Airlines’
grooming policy intended to enforce; she could wear
the cornrows off-duty; and if she were to maintain
her cornrows she could not wear her hair freely but
rather she would need to “wear her hair into a bun
and wrap a hairpiece around the bun during working
hours.” American Airline’s grooming regulations
conveyed the message (which the court reified) that
cornrows—a natural hairstyle Black women commonly and most notably wear—was an unprofessional and immodest hairstyle in need of covering
and thus, an unacceptable and impermissible hairstyle for Black women to wear in their professional
capacities, especially when engaging with the public.
(and Other Race-Based Characteristics) Got to Do With It?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV.
1355, 1372-76, 1385-91 (2008) [hereinafter What’s Hair].
85
Pitts, 2008 WL 1899306 at *6.
86
Id.
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Indeed, the court was rather dismissive of not only
the stigmatic but also the physical injury that American Airlines inflicted upon Rodgers by requiring
that she wear a hairpiece to mask her natural hairstyle. In response to Rodgers’ claims that she suffered severe headaches from wearing a hairpiece, the
court suggested rather imperviously “a larger hairpiece would seem in order.”87
Furthermore, the court intimated that American Airline’s regulation of Ms. Rodger’s hair would need to rise to the level of a hostile work environment in order for her injury to be cognizable.88
Since Ms. Rodgers’ seminal case of race-based grooming codes discrimination, courts have preserved the Rogers court’s narrow constitution of race, discrimination, and remediable injury under federal
civil rights laws.89 Courts have thereby treated employment policies
banning African descendant women’s natural hair as harmless acts
of employer prerogative unrelated to race and gender and inconsequential to workplace equality.90
In sanctioning the heightened scrutiny and occupational injuries
that Black women endure at the intersection of race and gender when
they freely don their naturally textured or curly hair in braids, twists,
or locks,91 Rogers has aided the suppression of Black women’s exercise of freedom, autonomy, and agency over their hair and through

87

What Not to Wear in the Workplace, supra note 40, at 349.
Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232 at 233 (remarking “plaintiff’s allegations do
not amount to charging American with ‘a practice of creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination,’ or one ‘so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers. . . .’) (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d
234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)).
89
See EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, No. 14-13482, 2016 WL
72210059, at *11 (11th Cir. Dec. 13, 2016).
90
See generally Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091
(5th Cir. 1975); see generally Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 2016 WL 7210059.
91
See Rogers v. Am. Airlines Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
see also Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 169 (1976)
(holding that a Black female plaintiff filed a sufficient EEOC charge alleging race
and gender discrimination after her supervisor allegedly informed her that she was
88
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their hair. Indeed, Rogers buttresses the lawfulness of making
straightened hairstyles—a racialized and gendered appearance norm
resulting from a long history of privileging hair texture and hairstyles associated with white women92—an implicit or explicit term
or condition of employment for Black women.93 As a result, Black
women’s hair plays a defining—and lawful—role in their employability and attendant economic and emotional security. With the filing of EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions94 in 2014, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission undertook a herculean
feat to disrupt this reality. The EEOC endeavored to invalidate over
three decades of negative precedent stemming from the Rogers decision, which courts mechanically applied to reject not only Black
women’s substantive claims of unlawful race discrimination, but
also their claims of retaliation for opposing an express hiring practice of excluding from consideration qualified applicants with
braided hair as a form of racial discrimination.95

denied a promotion because she was unable to represent the company wearing an
afro).
92
See D. Wendy Greene, Black Women Can’t Have Blonde Hair. . . in the
Workplace, 14 J. Gen. Race & Just. 405, 428 (2011) [hereinafter Black Women
Can’t Have Blonde Hair].
93
A recent Google search for “unprofessional hairstyles for women” primarily generated pictures of Black women donning natural hairstyles whereas a
search for “professional styles for women” yielded pictures of white women with
straightened coiffed hairstyles. Leigh Alexander, Do Google’s “Unprofessional
Hair” Results Show It Is Racist?, GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2016, 3:50 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/08/does-google-unprofessional-hair-results-prove-algorithms-racist.
94
First Amended Complaint at ¶ 27, EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions,
2014 WL 4745282 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 17, 2014) (No. 1:13-cv-00476-CB-M) [hereinafter First Amended Complaint].
95
See, e.g., McBride v. Lawstaf, Inc., No. 1:96-cv-0196-cc, 1996 WL
755779, at *1–2 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 1996) (rejecting plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim by holding that the plaintiff’s opposition to her employer–temporary
staffing agency’s policy of not referring “qualified applicants with ‘braided’ hair
styles for employment positions” was not protected activity because such policy
as a matter of law did not violate Title VII’s proscriptions against race–based employment practices). See also Pitts, 2008 WL 1899306 at *8 (citing to McBride
as precedential support for denying plaintiff’s retaliation claim based upon her
opposition to informal and formal regulations of her natural hair).
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II. SPLITTING HAIRS: EEOC V. CATASTROPHE MANAGEMENT
SOLUTIONS
A. The Federal District Court Decision
1. CHASTITY JONES’ HAIR STORY
In 2010, Chastity Jones applied for a customer service representative position with Catastrophe Management Solutions
(“CMS”), an Alabama-based insurance claims processing company.96 In this position, she would man phone calls in a call center.97
Based on her online application, Ms. Jones, along with numerous
other applicants, was invited by CMS to participate in a group interview.98 To the interview, she wore a blue business suit99 and her
locked blonde hair in a curly formation also known as “curlilocks.”100 After a successful group interview and an individual interview with a company trainer who reviewed the job responsibilities and her ability to perform them, CMS offered Ms. Jones the
job.101 Shortly thereafter, CMS’ Human Resources manager announced to the successful applicants the schedule for lab tests and
the completion of paper work that needed to take place before they
began working.102 The Human Resources manager informed the
new hires that they could meet with her individually about any conflicts they may have.103 At no point during the group sessions or the
individual meeting with the trainer, did any CMS representative
comment on Ms. Jones’ hair.104

96

See EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, No. 14-13482, 2016 WL
7210059, at *1 (11th Cir. Dec. 13, 2016).
97
See id.
98
See id.
99
See id.
100
Mark Fijman, EEOC Lawsuit Over Dreadlocks Sparks Criticism and Highlights Issues with Workplace Grooming Policies, MARTINDALE.COM (Oct. 11,
2013), https://www.martindale.com/labor-employment-law/article_Phelps-Dunbar-LLP_1993564.htm.
101
See Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 2016 WL 7210059 at *2.
102
See id.
103
See id.
104
See id.
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Per instructions, Ms. Jones spoke with the Human Resources
manager about a scheduling conflict and the Human Resources manager granted her request to take the lab tests on a different day.105
As Ms. Jones was preparing to depart, the Human Resources manager asked Ms. Jones if her hair were “dreadlocks.”106 Ms. Jones
confirmed that her curly “look” was in fact locks, to which the Human Resources manager replied that she was unable to hire her “with
the dreadlocks.”107 Naturally, Ms. Jones inquired why her locks
were problematic.108 The Human Resources manager responded,
“they tend to get messy, although I’m not saying yours are, but you
know what I’m talking about.”109 The Human Resources manager
also confided that previously, CMS asked a Black male applicant to
cut off his locks as a condition of employment, implying that Ms.
Jones would, too, have to cut off her hair.110 Ms. Jones indicated that
she would not cut her hair; immediately thereafter CMS’ Human
Resources manager rescinded the job offer and requested that Ms.
Jones return the paperwork provided earlier.111 Ms. Jones returned
the paperwork and left the premises.112 Though CMS’ Human Resources manager did not inform Ms. Jones of a formal policy prohibiting locks, CMS did have a grooming policy in place which advised that “[a]ll personnel are expected to be dressed and groomed
in a manner that projects a professional and businesslike image
while adhering to company and industry standards and/or guidelines . . . .[H]airstyles should reflect a business/professional image.
No excessive hairstyles or unusual colors are acceptable[.]”113

105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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2. THE EEOC’S LEGAL ARGUMENTS: SOME THINGS OLD, SOME
THINGS NEW
On behalf of Ms. Jones, the EEOC challenged CMS’ “no locks”
hiring practice as a form of intentional race discrimination in violation of Title VII.114 Armed with over thirty years of legal precedent
supporting the proposition that workplace proscriptions against
Black women’s braided hair are beyond the scope of Title VII, CMS
sought a dismissal of the EEOC’s case.115 In response, the EEOC
revived Renee Rodgers’ contention that mutable characteristics like
hair are central to Ms. Jones’ subjective understanding of her racial
identity.116 The EEOC maintained that “[b]ecause of the historical
truths and experiences of African Americans, it is only prudent for
courts to recognize that African-American hair identity is rooted in
African tradition. As such, natural [hair] styles are as much of a determinate of racial identity as melanoid skin.”117 Lastly, the EEOC
offered to present expert testimony to substantiate that “the wearing
of dreadlocks by Blacks has socio-cultural racial significance.”118
The EEOC also advanced novel legal theories to confront the
long-standing strict application of the immutability doctrine in racebased grooming code discrimination cases.119 On the one hand, the
EEOC sought to discontinue its application by offering a more expansive notion of race.120 Alternatively, the EEOC sought to demonstrate how a dreadlocks ban triggers the biological underpinnings of

114

See id. at *1.
See id.
116
See id. at *2–3. Relatedly, the EEOC asserted that the concept of race does
not simply embody immutable characteristics, see id. at *2; thus, Title VII’s prohibitions against race discrimination proscribes “employment discrimination
against a person because of cultural characteristics often linked to race or ethnicity, such as a person’s name, cultural dress and grooming practices, accent or
manner of speech,” id. at *10 (quoting the EEOC Compliance Manual, § 15–II, at
4 (2006)).
117
Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendant Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions’
Motion to Dismiss at 8, EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 11 F. Supp. 3d
(2014) (No. 13-cv-00476-CB-M), 2014 WL 4745282, at *13 [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Brief].
118
Id.
119
See id. at 11–12.
120
See id.
115
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the immutability doctrine.121 Both of these new legal arguments
were informed in part by the legal scholarship of critical race theorists.122 First, the EEOC posited that the immutability doctrine is
rooted in a discredited view of race as a fixed, biological construct
and not reflective of Congress’ legislative intent.123 Academics have
persuasively demonstrated that race is not a fixed, biological truth
but rather a social construction.124 In order to legitimize and facilitate a racial hierarchy as well as individual and systematic acts of
racial oppression and exclusion—like racial slavery, racial apartheid, and racially motivated violence—social, political, and legal
actors actively fostered notions of race and racial difference as inheritable and fixed.125 As a consequence of both orchestrated attempts to characterize, as well as subconscious mapping, race has
never been limited to one’s ancestry or one’s skin color. Historically
and contemporarily, mutable characteristics like one’s hair texture,
dress, name, or accent have also been treated as signifying racial
identity by both law and society.126 Consequently, mutable characteristics like hair are continuously racialized in law and society even
121

See id. at 2.
See id. at 10.
123
See id. at 6.
124
See, e.g., Ian Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1994) (explaining “[t]here are no genetic characteristics
possessed by all Blacks but not by non-Blacks; similarly, there is no gene or cluster of genes common to all Whites but not to non-Whites”).
125
See, e.g., Perkins v. Lake Cty. Dep’t of Utilities, 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1271
(N.D. Ohio 1994) (“Regrettably, racial classifications may be, and traditionally
have been, used to justify the exploitation of certain groups”); see also Christian
B. Sundquist, Science Fictions and Racial Fable: Navigating the Final Frontier
of Genetic Interpretation, 25 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 57, 57 (2009) (explaining
“[t]he perception that race should be defined in terms of genetic and biological
difference fueled the ‘race science’ of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
during which time geneticists, physiognomists, eugenicists, anthropologists and
others purported to find scientific justification for denying equal treatment to nonwhite persons”).
126
As Professor Angela Onwuachi-Willig and I have both noted, during the
era of racial slavery, one’s hair texture marked an individual as either presumptively free or enslaveable. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1100 (2010)
(“[H]air served as the true signifier of race in early racial trials” and served to
determine whether women “were American Indian and free, rather than black and
122
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when such characteristics “‘are not ‘uniquely’ or ‘exclusively’ ‘performed’ by or are attributed to a particular racial group.”127 In earlier
work, I have posited that race should be viewed as a socio-legal construct, acknowledging the ways in which law and society have affixed and continue to affix racial meanings and associations to mutable and immutable characteristics.128 Therefore, I have urged
courts to employ a broader understanding of race so that anti-discrimination law can attend to the deeper dimensions of racialization.129 Informed by my work130 and the scholarship of foundational
critical race theorists like Professor Paulette Caldwell131 the EEOC
urged the court to adopt a social constructionist understanding of
race and thus recognize that CMS’ prohibition against locks fit
within the purview of Title VII, as locks, like afros, twists, and
braids have been, and continue to be, associated with Blackness.132
The EEOC further submitted that by conferring absolute deference
to employers’ blanket prohibitions against locks—policies which facially apply to all employees regardless of race, yet almost exclusively regulate the hair of Black employees—“courts generally have
licensed employers to enforce a racial hierarchy that sanctions hairstyles and appearance associated with whites and outlaws those associated with Blacks.”133
In addition to stressing the ways in which African descendant
women’s naturally textured hair shape their personal identification
as Black women as well as the ways in which law and society have
marked them as Black on the basis of their hair, the EEOC posited

enslaved.”); see also Greene, What’s Hair, supra note 84, at 1366. (explaining
how a Virginia court in 1806 declared that despite one’s skin color or other physical characteristics that would signify whiteness, the propensity of one’s hair texture to become “woolly” or “kinky” marked an individual as an African descendant and presumptively enslaveable).
127
See Plaintiff’s Brief, supra note 117, at 10 (quoting What’s Hair, supra
note 84, at 1386).
128
See generally, What’s Hair, supra note 84, at 1359; see also Categorically
Black, White, or Wrong, supra note 43, at 133–35.
129
See, e.g., What’s Hair, supra note 84, at 1393–94.
130
See id; Black Women Can’t Have Blonde Hair, supra note 67.
131
Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of
Race and Gender, 40 DUKE L.J. 365, 379 (1991) [hereinafter A Hair Piece].
132
See Plaintiff’s Brief, supra note 117, at 10.
133
See id. at 12–13.
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an equally novel legal argument—one that emphasized the physiological qualities of Black women’s hair.134 Indeed, this argument
draws upon the influential scholarship of Professor Angela
Onwuachi-Willig.135 The EEOC highlighted Rogers and subsequent
courts’ lack of recognition that the hair textures with which many,
if not most, African descendant women are born allows them to
more easily lock, twist, and braid their hair, unlike most women who
identify as white.136 The EEOC explained that “both [afros and
braids] are ways of styling natural [chemically] unprocessed
hair.”137 Consequently, “[t]here is no principled or legal distinction
between policies prohibiting Afros and policies prohibiting dreadlocks. . . . [i]t is thus disingenuous to distinguish between natural
hair growth as immutable and natural hairstyles as mutable. They
are inextricably linked.”138 The EEOC submitted that it would present expert witness testimony that would confirm: 1) African descendants are the primary wearers of dreadlocks;139 2) locks “are a
reasonable and natural method of managing the physiological construct of Black hair”; and 3) dreadlocks are an immutable characteristic, unlike hair length or other hairstyles.”140
Significantly, for the first time in litigation challenging employers’ hyper-regulation of African descendant women’s hair, the
EEOC brought to light the burdens and consequences Black women
uniquely encounter when conforming to grooming policies that proscribe natural hairstyles.141 In its First Amended Complaint, the
134
See id. at 11. The EEOC also posited that the ban against locks was motivated by a particular stereotype that African descendants’ natural hair is “unconventional, unprofessional and/or not sufficiently conservative.” See id. at 12.
Therefore, CMS’ enactment and implementation of the grooming policy constituted unlawful racial stereotyping in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins wherein the court held that evidence of supervisors’
reliance upon conscious gender stereotypes about how a woman candidate should
dress, wear her hair, and behave to deny her a promotion can establish Title VII
liability. See Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 258.
135
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 126, at 1100.
136
See Plaintiff’s Brief, supra note 117, at 11.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 13.
140
Id.
141
See EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, No. 14-13482, 2016 WL
7210059, at *2–5 (11th Cir. Dec. 13, 2016).
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EEOC explained that workplace prohibitions against locks, twists,
and braids effectively require African descendant women to wear
straightened hair by donning hair weaves, wigs, or hair extensions,
along with applying chemical relaxers and/or extreme heat to their
hair.142 The EEOC pointed out that these methods of achieving and
maintaining straightened hair can be expensive, time-consuming,
and damaging to Black women’s physical well-being.143 Doing so
can also be damaging to Black women’s emotional well-being.144
Indeed, Black women may experience conforming to a straightened
hairstyle as an inauthentic “identity performance,” which Professors
Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati have explained “can be at odds with
the employee’s sense of identity [and thus,] to the extent the employee’s continued existence and success in the workplace is contingent upon her behaving in ways that operate as a denial of self,
there is continual harm to that employee’s dignity.”145
Professor Angela Onwuachi-Willig has enumerated the ways in
which wearing one’s naturally textured hair relieves Black women
of significant financial and temporal burdens that accompany donning straight hair via the use of permanent relaxers, temporary
straightening agents, hair extensions or wigs, which can result in irreparable hair and/or scalp damage.146 Professor Onwuachi-Willig
has also highlighted the negative psychological costs that Black
women endure to conform to a raced and gendered beauty norm of
donning straight hair.147 Moreover, fulfilling a straightened hairstyle
mandate or expectation can be not only harmful to one’s emotional
142

First Amended Complaint, supra note 94.
Id.
144
ALEXIS MCGILL JOHNSON ET AL., PERCEPTION INST., THE “GOOD HAIR”
STUDY: EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT ATTITUDES TOWARD BLACK WOMEN’S HAIR 11
(2017), https://perception.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/TheGood-HairStudy
FindingsReport.pdf.
145
Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 719-28 (2001).
146
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 126, at 1112–20.
147
Id. A recent Google search for “unprofessional hairstyles for women” primarily generated pictures of Black women donning natural hairstyles whereas a
search for “professional styles for women” yielded pictures of white women with
straightened coiffed hairstyles. Leigh Alexander, Do Google’s “Unprofessional
Hair” Results Show It Is Racist?, GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2016, 3:50 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/08/does-google-unprofessional-hair-results-prove-algorithms-racist-.
143
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well-being, but also to one’s physical health.148 In Dr. Nadia
Brown’s enlightening study examining how Black female legislators navigate colleagues’ and constituents’ expectations that they
don straightened hair, two legislators admitted that they purposefully avoided physical activities that might cause their hair to “‘revert back’ to its natural state.”149 The following findings of a more
recent study, The “Good Hair” Study: Explicit and Implicit Attitudes Toward Black Women’s Hair, published in February 2017 by
the Perception Institute, further substantiates the EEOC’s legal arguments:

148



Black women are more likely to report spending
more time on their hair than white women;



Black women are more likely to report having
professional styling appointments more often
than white women;



Black women are more likely to spend more
money on products for their hair than white
women;



Black women reported high levels of anxiety
about their hair and greater levels of anxiety than
white women reported;



Of those surveyed, twice as many Black women
feel social pressure to straighten their hair for
work; and



Three times as many Black women than white
women report that they disengage in exercise and
other physical activities because of their hair in

Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 126, at 1116–18.
Nadia Brown, “It’s More than Hair . . . That’s Why You Should Care”:
The Politics of Appearance for Black Women State Legislators, 2 POL., GROUPS,
AND IDENTITIES 295, 304 (2014).
149
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light of the significant monetary and temporal investment alongside the heightened professional
and social pressures to maintain straight hair.150
The Perception Institute’s timely study confirms insights I have
shared in earlier work:
Black women’s deliberations over their hair may be
shared to a certain extent by all women; however, the
extent to which these decisions are emotional, personal, political, and professional (and often driven by
fears of the resulting consequences) are unique to the
Black women’s experience—historically and contemporarily. This experience is deeply rooted in
American constructs of race, racism, and racial hierarchy out of which a particular negative stigmatization of Black women’s hair and resulting separation,
discrimination, and marginalization manifested in
both private and public spheres.151
The EEOC made visible this under-discussed or unknown experience of many Black women like Chastity Jones; the onus placed
upon Black women to satisfy an employer’s requirement or preference for straightened hair is often substantial. Therefore, when a
Black woman dons her naturally textured hair and thus does not assume the additional financial, temporal, and health-related burdens
to comply with this condition of employment—unrelated to her job
performance or ability—a direct violation of Title VII’s plain language results: she is deprived of employment opportunities for
which she is qualified on the basis of her race and gender.152 Ac-

150

JOHNSON, supra note 144, at 11.
See Black Women Can’t Have Blonde Hair, supra note 67, at 406–07.
152
See First Amended Complaint, supra note 94, at ¶ 31.; see also What Not
to Wear in the Workplace, supra note 40, at 365 (positing that disqualifying African descendant women from employment opportunities when they don their natural hair “arbitrarily deprives or tends to deprive [Black women from the] acquisition and maintenance of employment for which they are qualified in violation
of Title VII’s plain language”).
151
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cordingly, the EEOC argued Ms. Jones and other Black women consequently suffer “a penalty for employment that White [female] applicants and employees are not required to endure.”153
3. THE DISTRICT COURT’S ANALYSIS: AFROS ARE RACIAL BUT
LOCKS ARE CULTURAL
Upon reviewing the motions of the EEOC and Catastrophe Management Solutions, the federal district court rejected the well-supported social constructionist view of race, and once again applied
the biologically rooted immutability doctrine to conclude that the
EEOC could never put forth an actionable race discrimination
case.154 First, according to the court, adopting a broader notion of
race would lead to “absurd results” because both white and Black
employees who donned locks could challenge the application of
CMS’ grooming policy.155 Strictly adhering to the immutability doctrine and the beliefs that informed it, the district court in Catastrophe
Management Solutions endorsed the idea that CMS’ subjective
grooming policy could not be race-based if individuals who did not
share the same racial identity can be subject to its enforcement.156

153

See Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 7, EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, No. 14-13482, (11th Cir. Oct. 31, 2016) [hereinafter Petition for Rehearing]. .
154
EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, No. 14-13482, 2016 WL 7210059,
at *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 13, 2016). In making this argument, the EEOC relied upon
the scholarship of critical race legal theorists and the guidance in its Compliance
Manual which states that the “concept of race encompasses cultural characteristics
related to race and ethnicity [including] grooming practices.” See also supra n. 44
(highlighting the decision of the Chicago Commission on Human Relations that
barring the entry of African descendant male patrons because they donned braids
constituted unlawful race discrimination in part because it recognized braids as a
“disfavored a hairstyle associated with one racial group based on stereotypical
assumptions about wearers of the hairstyle, imposing an additional burden on that
group in order to enjoy the full use of the public accommodations it offered”).
Notably, the Commission considered legal scholarship in developing its opinion.
See Constance Dionne Russell, Styling Civil Rights: The Effect of S 1981 and the
Public Accommodations Act on Black Women’s Access to White Stylists and Salons, 24 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 189 (2008); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 126;
Greene, What’s Hair, supra note 84.
155
EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 11 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1143 (S.D.
Ala. 2014).
156
Id. at 1143–44.
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However, this is a very restrictive view of Title VII’s scope of protection.157 For example, if an employer banned white employees
from wearing locks but allowed Black employees to do so, the former would have an actionable Title VII claim.158 Such evidence is a
textbook example of intentional race discrimination or differential
treatment on the basis of race. Furthermore, if an employer expressed that donning locks were “too Black,”159 evidence that this
racial stereotype consciously motivated a negative employment action would establish a violation of Title VII regardless of the racial
identity of the lock wearer.160 Accordingly, statutory protection generally is not dictated by the identity of the complainant, but rather,
the impermissible conduct of the covered employer.161
Guided by the immutability doctrine, the district court also declared that “Title VII does not protect against discrimination based
on traits, even a trait that has sociocultural racial significance.”162
157
158
159

Id.
Id.
Professor Paulette Caldwell explained in her seminal work:
[T]he rationalizations that accompanied opposition to
Afro hairstyles in the 1960s—extreme, too unusual, not businesslike, inconsistent with a conservative image, unprofessional, inappropriate with business attire, too ”black”
(i.e., too militant), unclean—are used today to justify the categorical exclusion of braided hairstyles [and other natural hairstyles adorned by African descendants] in many parts of the
workforce, particularly in jobs that are either traditionally conservative or highly structured, involve close immediate supervision, or require significant contact with the public.

Caldwell, supra note 47, at 384–85 (emphasis added).
160
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
161
Id.; But see, e.g., Jackson v. Deen, 959 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1354 (S.D. Ga.
Aug. 12, 2013) (holding that a female plaintiff who identified as white did not
have standing to challenge discriminatory comments directed toward and made
about African American employees and segregation of African American employees in the workplace because she was “not an aggrieved party under Title VII”
since none of the “racially offensive comments [and segregationist policies] were
either directed toward [her] or made with the intent to harass her.”).
162
Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 11 F. Supp. 3d at 1144. See generally Juan
F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating “National Origin” Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 805, 810 (1994). (examining the
overlapping nature of race and ethnicity).
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Relying upon Seventh Circuit precedent, the court pontificated “culture and race are two distinct concepts [. . . ] [c]ulture is ‘a set of
behavioral characteristics and therefore significantly dissimilar
from the immutable characteristics of race and national
origin.’”163[L1] The district court thereby reiterated that an afro is an
immutable, racial characteristic protected against discrimination,
whereas the unimpeded growth of an afro like locks is a mutable,
cultural characteristic beyond the scope of Title VII protection.164 It
opined that “a hairstyle is not inevitable and immutable just because
it is a reasonable result of hair texture, which is an immutable characteristic.”165 The court emphatically declared that “no amount of
expert testimony can change the fact that dreadlocks is a hairstyle.”166 Yet, the court suggested that CMS’ prohibition against
locks could transform from a matter of permissible cultural discrimination into one of impermissible race discrimination if the EEOC’s
expert witnesses could demonstrate “Blacks are the exclusive wearers of dreadlocks.”167 Thus, by treating afros as legally protected
hair texture and any other configuration of afro hair texture as legally unprotected hairstyles, the court literally split hairs to preserve
four decades of legal precedent protecting the former.168
Ultimately, the federal district court in Catastrophe Management Solutions dismissed the EEOC’s complaint and request to
amend the original complaint, holding that the EEOC could not
bring a plausible claim of intentional race discrimination.169 Procedurally and substantively, the court constricted the possibility of initiating a viable race-based grooming codes discrimination case.170
163

Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 11 F. Supp. 3d at 1144.
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id. (emphasis added).
167
Id.
168
Id. at 1142–43.
169
Id. at 1144; Order Denying Motion to Amend Complaint, EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, No. 13-00476-CB-M (S.D. Ala. Jun. 2, 2014).
170
Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 11 F. Supp. 3d at 1141. On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the district
court dismissed the EEOC’s Title VII intentional race discrimination employing
the Supreme Court’s heightened “plausibility” pleading standard adopted in Bell
Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662 (2009). By dismissing the EEOC’s complaint the court held that based upon
the allegations asserted in the EEOC’s original and amended complaints, the
164
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The federal district court foreclosed the opportunity for plaintiffs to:
1) engage in meaningful discovery to the uncover the motivations
for and application of a “no-locks” policy; 2) produce expert witness
testimony to educate the court on African descendants’ naturally
textured hair and the racial dynamics of workplace prohibitions
against natural hair; and 3) pursue a cognizable theory of intentional
race discrimination which permits plaintiffs to produce evidence of
the disparate race-based burdens in complying with a “neutral”
grooming policy.171 Thus, more expressly than the Rogers court, the
district court in EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions signaled to employers that they may not condition a Black woman’s
employment upon changing her natural hair texture when worn short
but that they are authorized to do so under any other circumstances.172
B. The Eleventh Circuit Decision
In 2014, the EEOC appealed the district court’s decision to the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Notably, the Eleventh Circuit
entertained the EEOC’s appeal in the wake of public controversy
EEOC could not establish a plausible claim of intentional race discrimination nor
could it engage in discovery to uncover additional evidence to establish its claims.
Consequently, the courts’ decisions in EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions presents important substantive and procedural issues specific to employment
discrimination cases in need of addressing. See e.g., Suzette Malveaux, Front
Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65,
67–68 (2010) (arguing “[c]ourt’s new plausibility pleading standard, is more outcome determinative for civil rights cases because of the informational inequity
that exists between the parties and the evidentiary hurdles that exist for such
claims . . . [and] [p]laintiffs alleging intentional discrimination are at a distinct
evidentiary disadvantage pre-discovery because of the difficulty in uncovering
facts sufficient to demonstrate illegal motive”).
171
Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 11 F. Supp. 3d at 1144. See generally Jespersen v. Harrah’s Oper. Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104, 1108–09 (9th Cir. 2006) (articulating the undue burdens analysis that can be used establish intentional discrimination violative of Title VII if a plaintiff can demonstrate that compliance
with an employer’s grooming policy results in more onerous burdens on a group
of individuals on the basis of a protected trait like sex or race).
172
Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 11 F. Supp. 3d at 1142–43. Unless there is
evidence that individuals were treated differently on the basis of race or that the
employer consciously crafted the policy to exclude individuals on the basis of
race.
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surrounding the United States Army’s grooming policy that barred
natural hairstyles commonly and traditionally worn by African descendant servicewomen like two-strand twists, locks, braids, and afros.173 The regulation also referred to these hairstyles as “matted and
unkempt.”174 Strikingly, the same demeaning stereotypes about
Black women’s naturally textured hair that CMS verbally communicated to Ms. Jones as the rationale for its informal “no locks” policy motivated the Army’s written natural hairstyle ban. 175 Though
any person’s hair can become unkempt, matted, or messy, both employers treated the unimpeded growth of Black women’s hair as
uniquely susceptible to being disheveled or unclean and thereby penalized Black women who grew their naturally textured hair long or
wore it in more efficient or subjectively pleasing formations like
twists, locks, or braids.176 Upon reconsideration, Secretary of Defense Hagel and other military leaders agreed with the female mem-

173

See Rhodan, supra note 17.
Id.
175
Id. See also Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 11 F. Supp. 3d at 1140.
176
See Rhodan, supra note 17. Unfortunately, the punishment Black women
endure for simply wearing their natural hair is not limited to adulthood or their
professional experiences; the penalties they suffer with impunity often begin during childhood. During the span of one week in the spring of 2017, private school
administrators in Florida and Massachusetts punished African descendant girls for
donning their hair in afros and braids respectively. http://www.wctv.tv/content/news/Local-teen-told-cant-wear-hairstyle-at-school-423232994.html
https://www.yahoo.com/style/time-stop-hair-policing-children-143201370.html.
http://www.fox32chicago.com/news/254824241-story. These recent incidences
of race-based grooming codes discrimination in the education context illustrate
the tangible impact of judicial decisions like Rogers v. American Airlines and
EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions. In its public statement defending
the decisions to proscribe synthetic braids and discipline twin sisters for refusing
to remove their braids, the private school in Massachusetts cited federal precedent
authorizing parallel workplace prohibitions as legal support. Alluding to the raceimmutability/culture-mutability distinction the federal judiciary has maintained in
the workplace context, the school’s administration expressly stated, “[s]ome have
asserted that our prohibition on artificial hair extensions violates a ‘cultural right,’
but that view is not supported by the courts, which distinguish between policies
that affect a person’s natural ‘immutable’ characteristics and those that prohibit
practices based on changeable cultural norms.”http://www.newsweek.com/
malden-ma-dress-code-charter-school-policy-613691?utm_content=buffer953
da&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer
174
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bership of the Congressional Black Caucus, finding that the military’s proscriptions were not simply offensive, but also racially discriminatory.177 The United States Army and the United States Air
Force removed the bans against Black servicewomen’s natural hairstyles as well as accompanying, derogatory descriptors from their
grooming policies.178
In its appellate brief, the EEOC situated CMS’ workplace ban
within broader social context, noting the U.S. military’s appreciation of: the intersectional dimensions of its natural hair bans; the unequal burdens these grooming mandates imposed upon African descendant servicewomen to obtain and maintain their employment;
and the irrelevance of Black women’s hair to their serving and protecting our country. Thus, just as the United States military acknowledged the racially discriminatory nature of its grooming policy, the
EEOC implored that the time was ripe for the federal judiciary to
reconsider its rigid stance in race-based challenges against parallel
natural hair bans instituted by private employers. The EEOC maintained:
[e]ven the Army, Navy and Air Force, which are
known for strict uniform standards governing military appearance, have revised their recent bans on
dreadlocks, cornrows, and braids after receiving numerous complaints indicating that the service-level
grooming policies were racially biased against Black
women who choose to wear their hair in natural hairstyles rather than to use heat or chemicals to
straighten the hair or wigs to cover it.179

177

Rhodan, supra note 17.
In January 2017, the Army’s ban against twists, locks, and braids adorned
by African descendant servicewomen was effectively reversed yet the policy continues to impose burdensome and subjective conditions for compliance, requiring
twists, braids, and locks to have a “uniform dimension; have a diameter no greater
than a half-inch; and present a neat, professional and well-groomed appearance.”
Zeba Blay, U.S. Army Lifts Ban on Dreadlocks, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 10, 2017,
4:31 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/us-army-lifts-ban-on-dreadlocks_us_589e1cfee4b03df370d64723 (updated Feb. 21, 2017).
179
Brief of the EEOC as Plaintiff-Appellant, EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 837 F.3d 1156 (11th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-13482), 2014 WL 4795874.
178
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Though the three-judge panel recognized Ms. Jones’ “intensely
personal” nature of wearing locks and Ms. Jones’ refusal to cut
them, it was not persuaded by the military’s decision to rescind its
grooming policies. Rather, the court amplified employers’ legal
right to engage in the hyper-regulation of African descendant
women’s bodies via their hair.
A little over a year after oral arguments, the three-judge panel
issued its first opinion followed by a revised opinion in December
2016.180 Notably, the panel first addressed the EEOC’s theory of liability. It concluded that by describing the consequences of a “no
locks” policy with terms like “impact,” “disadvantage,” and “adverse effects” during oral arguments and in its complaints, the
EEOC conflated the disparate impact and disparate treatment theories of liability.181 Thus, the panel did not consider the EEOC’s allegations concerning the burdens or consequences that the locks ban
imposed upon Black women like Ms. Jones as such allegations
seemingly cannot support a claim of intentional race discrimination.182 The panel asserted that it would focus its analysis on
“whether the protected trait actually motivated the employer’s decision.”183 To answer this query, similarly to the court below, the
Eleventh Circuit applied a restrictive definition of an immutable
characteristic previously articulated in circuit decisions, concluding
that a “protected trait” under Title VII is one that an individual “is
born with or cannot change.”184 The court also expressed that the
180
EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sol., 837 F.3d 1156 (11th Cir. 2016), withdrawn and superseded by, No. 14-13482, 2016 WL 7210059 (11th Cir. Dec. 13,
2016).
181
Id. at 9–14.
182
A plaintiff is not precluded from articulating the burdens, consequences, or
impact of an employment practice in an intentional discrimination case nor does
doing so compel the automatic application of a disparate impact theory of liability.
Title VII’s plain language does not require such a line of demarcation between
disparate treatment and disparate impact. Furthermore, a litigant should not be
confined to a particular set of allegations or evidence in order to state an actionable claim of unlawful discrimination. A litigant should be able to support her
claim with allegations or evidence that illuminates the injury or harm that results
from an employment practice. See id.
183
Id. at 14 (citing Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003) (ellipses and internal quotation marks omitted).
184
Id. at 21 (citing Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1389
(11th Cir. 1998); Gilchrist v. Bolger, 733 F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir. 1984).
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specific focus of Title VII’s prohibitions against discrimination are
“matters that are either beyond the victim’s power to alter or that
impose a burden on an employee on one of the prohibited bases.”185
The Eleventh Circuit reiterated the district court’s hair splitting
demarcation between impermissible and permissible regulation of
African descendants’ hair.186 According to the panel, “discrimination on the basis of black hair texture (an immutable characteristic)
is prohibited by Title VII, while adverse action on the basis of black
hairstyle (a mutable choice) is not.”187 To derive this holding, the
panel in part rigidly applied nearly four decades of legal precedent,
explaining that “the distinction between and mutable characteristics
of race can sometimes be a fine (and difficult one), but it is a line
that courts have drawn.”188 The panel distinguished the Rogers decision denying Renee Rodgers statutory protection for discrimination against her braids from another federal district court recognizing a Black woman’s intentional race discrimination claim when she
was denied a promotion because she donned an afro.189 As a result,
the Eleventh Circuit ruled that in order for locks to be deemed a
racial characteristic as opposed to a cultural characteristic, the
EEOC (and plaintiffs to follow) would have to allege that locks were
not a function of personal choice, but rather that all, and/or only,
individuals who identify as African descendants donned locks or are
born with them.190 As Professor Ian Haney Lopez has explained
“[t]here are no genetic characteristics possessed by all Blacks but
not by non-Blacks; similarly, there is no gene or cluster of genes
common to all Whites but not to non-Whites.”191 Therefore, it is impossible for a race discrimination plaintiff to produce evidence that
the proscribed trait is exclusively adorned by individuals who share
the same racial identity.192 By establishing an unfulfillable evidentiary standard, the court significantly departed from the Rogers
185
Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 837 F.3d at 22 (quoting Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975)).
186
Id. at 24.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id. (citing Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins. Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 168
(7th Cir. 1976)).
190
Id.
191
Lopez, supra note 124, at 11.
192
See id.
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court, which hypothesized an actionable race-based grooming codes
discrimination case if it were shown that predominantly Black people adorn braids.193 Thus, with this heightened evidentiary standard,
the Eleventh Circuit (like the district court) signaled that workplace
discrimination against racialized, mutable characteristics would
never implicate Title VII protection.
It is important to note that unlike the district court, the Eleventh
Circuit examined the query: what is race? 194 The three-judge panel
engaged the work of race and law scholars who have posited that
race is a social construct “rather than an absolute biological
truth.”195 Acknowledging the persuasiveness of these scholarly arguments, the panel nonetheless maintained that the current definition of race be guided by the outdated (arguably biological) understanding of race in 1964 when the Civil Rights Act became law.196
To discern how Congress might have understood the concept of race
when it enacted Title VII, the court reviewed dictionary entries published in the 1960s.197 It surmised that race “referred to common
physical characteristics shared by a group of people and transmitted
by their ancestors over time.”198 Noting that none of the sources examined used the term “immutable” in defining race, the panel still
maintained, “it is not a linguistic stretch to think that [racial] characteristics are a matter of birth, and not culture.”199 To the panel, an
interpretive rule like the immutability doctrine which limits protection against race discrimination to characteristics with which one is
born is sound and logical. However, the Eleventh Circuit complicated the race-immutability/culture-mutability distinction that previous courts constructed to deny statutory protection in race-based
grooming codes discrimination cases. Applying this framework, the
panel denominated afros a “black hair texture” and locks a “black
hairstyle” despite recognizing the EEOC’s claim that Ms. Jones’

193

See Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 11 F. Supp. at 1143; Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
194
Id. at 15–18.
195
Id. at 18.
196
Id. at 18–19.
197
Id. at 16–18.
198
Id.
199
Id. at 18.
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locks are a “natural outgrowth of black hair texture” or the unimpeded growth of an afro.200 Notably, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the lower court’s loose assertion that even though locks are a “‘natural outgrowth’ of the texture of black hair [it] does not make [locks]
an immutable characteristic of race.”201 Like the Rogers court, the
Eleventh Circuit and the district court dictated to Black women what
their natural hair is and means. Per the court’s reasoning, afros are
an immutable characteristic of Blackness because either only African descendants are born with an afro-like hair texture or those who
have such hair texture are African descendants. Thus, employer discrimination against afros constitutes unlawful race discrimination.
Whereas, locks are mutable, cultural characteristics since African
descendants are neither the exclusive wearers of locks nor are they
born with them. As such, discrimination against locks falls beyond
Title VII’s scope of protection. In effect, this puzzling race-immutability/culture-mutability framework the Eleventh Circuit reinforced legally defines not only locks but also any other formation of
textured or curly hair, like braids or twists, as mutable, cultural hairstyles which employers are free to regulate or prohibit.
The panel appeared to interpret the arguments of race and law
scholars who have urged courts to adopt a social constructionist
view of race as support for this head-scratching conclusion.202 According to the court, “there have been some calls by [legal scholars]
for courts to interpret Title VII more expansively by eliminating the
biological conception of ‘race’ and encompassing cultural characteristics associated with race.”203 However, when these legal scholars, including myself, have advocated for courts to treat mutable
characteristics such as skin color, hair, language, and dress as constitutive of race, it is not simply because they may be culturally significant to the wearer. Rather, the scholarship to which the court
cites for this proposition simply explains that traits with which one
is born are not the sole characteristics that law and society have used
to mark one’s racial identity.204 Mutable characteristics have played
and continue to play a critical role in the external classification of
200
201
202
203
204

Id. at 24, 29.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 17–20.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 6.
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an individual’s race and attendant discrimination; mutable characteristics also inform individuals’ subjective understanding of their
racial identity.205 Consequently, legal scholars have urged courts to
employ a broader notion of race which acknowledges this historic
and contemporary reality. Moreover, the race-immutability/culturemutability distinction that courts have created fails to acknowledge
the reality that race and culture are overlapping constructs just as
race and religion or race and national origin can be.206 However, it
does not follow that because a characteristic can be deemed both
racial and cultural, an employer’s discrimination against this characteristic falls outside Title VII’s purview.
III. LOCKED OUT: THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE IMMUTABILITY
DOCTRINE
A. Strict Immutability: “A Legal Fiction”
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal’s 1975 decision in Willingham
v. Macon Telephone Publishing Company shaped the courts’ decisions in Rogers v. American Airlines and EEOC v. Catastrophe
Management Solutions.207 In Willingham, the Fifth Circuit held that
a private employer did not engage in unlawful sex discrimination
when it refused to hire a qualified male applicant as a copy layout
artist because he donned shoulder length hair.208 In doing so, the
Fifth Circuit attempted to carve out a definitive sphere of employment practices that could subject an employer to Title VII liability
205

Categorically Black, White, or Wrong, supra note 43, at 134.
See, e.g., Smith v. Specialty Pool Contractors, No. 02:07cv1464, 2008 WL
4410163 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2008) (denying summary judgment in a Title VII
race and religious discrimination case where the plaintiff, a practicing Catholic,
alleged racial and religious harassment because his father is Jewish). See also,
Ortiz v. Bank of America, 547 F. Supp. 550, 560 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (arguing “the
notion of “race” as contrasted with national origin is highly dubious”). See Perkins
v. Lake Cty. Dep’t of Utilities, 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1272 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (arguing courts have engaged in “mental gymnastics” to define race and national origin
and characterize them as discrete concepts for the purposes of deciding whether a
plaintiff’s discrimination claims are actionable under federal anti-discrimination
laws).
207
Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, No. 14-13482, 2016 WL 7210059, at *8–
10.
208
Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975).
206
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for unlawful sex or race discrimination and those that employers
could freely implement without judicial oversight. The court pronounced that:
[e]qual employment opportunity may be secured
only when employers are barred from discriminating
against employees on the basis of immutable characteristics, such as race and national origin. . . . But a
hiring policy that distinguishes on some other
ground, such as grooming codes or length of hair, is
related more closely to the employer’s choice of how
to run his business than to equality of employment
opportunity. . . . If the employee objects to the
grooming code he has the right to reject it by looking
elsewhere for employment, or alternatively he may
choose to subordinate his preference by accepting
the code along with the job.209
Though it is not supported in Title VII’s plain language, since
Willingham, the Fifth Circuit’s strict immutability doctrine has
served as a prerequisite to statutory protection in a variety of civil
rights cases;210 in the race discrimination context, the immutability
doctrine has been employed to dismiss cases involving employer
regulation of mutable characteristics like hair color,211 hairstyles,212
209

Id. (emphasis added).
See Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 29 (2015)
(Explaining “[e]ven though the term immutability does not appear in any employment discrimination statute, courts have borrowed immutability concepts [from
the constitutional context] to answer definitional questions about the scope of statutory prohibitions on discrimination”).
211
See e.g, Santee v. Windsor Court Hotel Ltd. P’ship, No. Civ.A.99-3891,
2000 WL 1610775, at *3-4 (E.D. La. Oct. 26, 2000) (holding that a Black woman
with dyed blonde hair, who was denied employment because her blonde hair violated the hotel’s grooming policy banning “extreme” hairstyles, could not establish a prima facie case of race discrimination under Title VII because hair color
was not an immutable characteristic).
212
See, e.g., Eatman v. United Parcel Serv., 194 F. Supp. 2d 256, 262
(S.D.N.Y.2002) (dismissing a Black male employee’s Title VII race discrimination case challenging an employer’s requirement that employees who wore locks
to cover them with a wool hat because the employee could not demonstrate per
the immutability doctrine that locks were unique to African descendants). Opinion
located at:
210
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and language213. The immutability doctrine, like other central features of anti-discrimination jurisprudence “is not required by the operative language of the federal employment discrimination statutes,
but flows from the ways in which the courts tend to think. . . . “214
One can surmise that courts’ conceptualization of race in Rogers v.
American Airlines and in EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions is grounded in entrenched perceptions that one’s racial identity
is a static, biological identity and/or that one’s race is marked by
immutable physical characteristics, arguably like skin color.215 Indeed, numerous legal scholars have convincingly demonstrated how
these notions of identity shape antidiscrimination law. For example,
Professor Natasha Martin has explained:
[d]iscrimination law confronts identity as if it were
static, and this approach has been shown to be inadequate in capturing the complexity of identity and the
perceptions of employees in contemporary work settings. The protected-class approach under Title VII
has focused largely on the physical embodiment of
the identity category—the immutable aspects of an
individual’s identity.216

https://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/cchr/DataPortalDocs/09P002Feb162011.pdf.
213
See, e.g., Kahakua v. Friday, 876 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1989) (unpublished
table decision), No. 88-1668, 1989 WL 61762, at *3 (9th Cir. June 2, 1989) (declining to decide the issue of whether an employer’s decision was based on plaintiffs’ dialect constitutes race and national origin discrimination where plaintiffs
claimed race and national origin discrimination because they were allegedly denied positions as broadcasters because of their Hawaiian Creole accent or dialect).
See generally Greene, What’s Hair, supra note 84, at 1369; see also Peter Brandon Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Definition of Discrimination Under
Title VII, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769, 773 (1987).
214
Sandra Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69,
101–02 (2011) (critiquing courts’ interpretation of 703(a)(1) of Title VII as prohibiting disparate treatment and 703(a)(2) as prohibiting unintentional discrimination though such a distinction is unsupported by the text and it frustrates the
goals of the statute).
215
See Categorically Black, White, or Wrong, supra note 43, at 131–36.
216
Natasha T. Martin, Diversity and the Virtual Workplace: Performance
Identity and Shifting Boundaries of Workplace Engagement, 16 LEWIS & CLARK
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Accordingly, it appears that the strict immutability doctrine is a
consequence of judicial understanding of identity, namely racial and
gender identity, as constitutive of fixed, biological characteristics—
despite scholars’ persuasive arguments to the contrary.217 It is therefore reasonable to conclude that this concept of immutability embraced by the courts in Willingham, Rogers, and Catastrophe Management Solutions reflects a reflexive understanding of race as a stable biological construct and in turn, there are inexorably fixed characteristics that denote one’s race. This notion is not extraordinary;
many adhere to the idea—consciously and unconsciously—that race
is a fixed, biological construct and characteristics constituting one’s
racial identity are those with which one is born, inheritable, impossible or difficult to change, and singularly displayed by individuals
who share the same racial identity.218 Consequently, it seems that
judges’ endorsement of strict immutability in race-based grooming
codes discrimination cases is distinctively informed by understandings of racial identity—namely Black identity—as an involuntary,
genetic, and unchangeable state of being marked by a darker skin
complexion and textured hair, which contemporary events like Rachel Dolezal’s claim of Blackness complicate.219 Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit’s and the district court’s pronouncement in Catastrophe
L. REV. 605, 642 (2012). See also Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment Discrimination Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1483, 1509
(2011) (arguing that “[t]he concept of immutability has been a fixture in both constitutional and statutory analysis of discrimination issues . . . [and] is a unifying
principle that satisfactorily explains the protected classifications [covered in employment discrimination statutes]”).
217
See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINNANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S (2d ed. 1994); see also Lopez,
supra note 124, at 11.
218
See Categorically Black, White, or Wrong, supra note 43, at 133-36 (2013)
(recognizing the undetected salience of race as a biological construct within contemporary social and legal thinking even though it has been firmly established
that race is not a genetic but rather a social construct—a construct which has real,
defining meaning).
219
Chris McGreal, Rachel Dolezal: ‘I wasn’t identifying as black to upset people. I was being me’, GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2015, 1:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/13/rachel-dolezal-i-wasnt-identifying-as-black-to-upset-people-i-was-being-me. I am in no way making a judgment as to whether Rachel Dolezal can stake a legitimate claim to Black American identity. I mention
her story merely as a contemporary example of racial fluidity. It is also important
to point out that hair played a critical role in Rachel Dolezal’s self-identification
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Management Solutions that an afro is “an immutable Black hair texture,” appears to derive from a belief that African descendants are
exclusively born with an afro or possess a hair texture that will inevitably grow into an afro. Richard Simmons’ afro challenges this
operating assumption.220 Despite clear evidence to the contrary,
courts have calcified as fact an evident belief that undergirds the application of strict immutability in race discrimination cases challenging natural hair bans: all and/or only African descendants are
born with or are capable of adorning afros. Strict immutability,
therefore, serves as a “legal fiction”: a rule created by judicial, legislative, and political bodies, which is not based in fact, yet is treated
as such in legitimating zones of protection and inclusion. To satisfy
the contours of strict immutability articulated in EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions, race discrimination plaintiffs challenging discrimination against mutable characteristics must demonstrate
one of the following: 1) all individuals or only individuals who share
a particular racial identity possess the regulated characteristic; 2) the
regulated characteristic cannot be changed; or 3) the regulated characteristic is one with which an individual is born.221 This heightened
version of strict immutability superficially narrows the purview of

or portrayal as a Black woman. Over the years, she has covered her naturally
straight blonde hair by wearing synthetic braids and cornrows along with weaves
or wigs styled like an afro.
220
Richard Simmons is a celebrity fitness guru who identifies as white and is
widely known for his large red afro. It is important to make clear the fact that
Richard Simmons dons an afro does not now transform a workplace ban against
afros into a regulation of a non-racial, cultural characteristic beyond the scope of
Title VII proscriptions against race discrimination. It merely confirms that there
is no one characteristic that only individuals who identify as Black or white, for
example, possess. See Lopez, supra note 124, at 11 (explaining “[t]here are no
genetic characteristics possessed by all Blacks but not by non-Blacks; similarly,
there is no gene or cluster of genes common to all Whites but not to non-Whites”).
Therefore, more accurate bases for conferring statutory protection to employer
regulation of afros are that law and society link afros to African ancestry and African descendants often wear afros as an expression of their racial identity like
locks, twists, and braids.
221
See generally EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 11 F. Supp. 3d 1139,
1144 (S.D. Ala. 2014) (holding that the dreadlocked hair style was a mutable characteristic because “Blacks are not the exclusive wearers of dreadlocks”) (emphasis
in original).
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protection against race discrimination under current anti-discrimination laws, which the following examples illustrate.222
Imagine that one day, a Black woman comes to work with her
naturally textured or curly hair in a cropped style likely deemed an
afro. The next day, she arrives at work with her naturally textured or
curly hair in defined two-strand twists. Applying the strict immutability doctrine and the attendant demarcation between Black hair
texture and Black hairstyles the Eleventh Circuit espoused, if the
employer fires the woman because her hair appears to be an afro
then she can benefit from Title VII’s protections against race discrimination. Yet, at the point she twists or braids her hair, federal
protection against race discrimination is no longer available to her.
Similarly, based upon the Eleventh Circuit’s race-immutability/culture-mutability distinction, it would have been unlawful for CMS to
disqualify Ms. Jones from employment for which she was demonstrably qualified if she wore her natural hair texture in a cropped,
unstraightened hairstyle. However, because Ms. Jones grew her natural hair texture longer and locked, the EEOC’s Title VII claim of
race discrimination on her behalf failed and (magically) CMS’
grooming policy and Ms. Jones’ rescinded job offer fell within the
bounds of lawfulness. All of these instances of discrimination involve the same woman with the same hair texture. However, one act
of discrimination is deemed unlawful and the other is legal; one act
of discrimination is deemed remediable and the other irreparable.
The legal fiction, strict immutability, produces these incoherent and
unfair results.

222

Not all federal courts have applied the immutability doctrine to determine
whether an employer’s regulation of non-physical, mutable characteristics constitutes unlawful race discrimination. The Ninth Circuit held that an employer’s discrimination against a plaintiff’s non-physical, mutable characteristic was unlawful. See, e.g., El-Hakem v. BJY Inc., 415 F.3d 1068, 1073–74 (9th Cir. 2005)
(holding that an employer’s directives to an Arab-American employee to change
his name to a “Western” sounding name as well as renaming the employee against
his objections because clients may find him “more acceptable” constitutes intentional race discrimination under Section 1981). Acknowledging that “names are
often a proxy for race and ethnicity” the Ninth Circuit held that discrimination
against a “genetically-determined physical trait” is not required for an actionable
race discrimination claim. Id. at 1073.
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B. Strict Immutability: At Odds with the Law?
The immutability doctrine is not simply unsupported by Title
VII’s plain language; courts’ strict application is also at odds with
the statutory language and established evidentiary routes to prove
intentional race discrimination. Again, section 703(a) of Title VII
makes it unlawful for a covered employer:
(1)
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his . . . terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment . . . ; or
(2)
to limit, segregate, or classify his employees
or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.223
Employers’ hyper-regulation of Black women’s hair renders discriminatory terms, conditions, and privileges of employment on the
basis of race and/or gender. Additionally, the implementation and
enforcement of these grooming policies do in fact deprive Black
women employment—for which they are qualified or successfully
perform—because of their race and/or gender.224
For example, it appears that at no point throughout the series of
interviews with Ms. Jones did CMS representatives perceive her hair
as unprofessional or unkempt and thus violative of CMS’ written
grooming policy. In fact, upon learning that Ms. Jones’ was wearing
her hair in locks, CMS’ Human Resources Manager conveyed to
Ms. Jones that she did not find her hair to be unkempt; nevertheless,
she informed Jones that she was required to cut off her hair because
it could become messy—in the future. It is important to note that
the Human Resources Manager’s perceptions about Ms. Jones’ hair
changed simply because Jones confirmed that she was wearing
223

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2010) (italics added).
Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 2016 WL 7210059 at *4 (choosing to only
view the case through the lens of disparate treatment as opposed to disparate impact).
224

1032

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:987

locks.225 The Human Resources Manager’s reaction is not surprising
if one considers the ways society stigmatizes locks as unprofessional
or indicative of criminality and uncleanliness and how these preconceived, pejorative associations manifest themselves in the workplace especially when African descendants adorn locks.226 With that
said, if the EEOC had the opportunity to engage in discovery, evidence gathered could reveal that CMS’ Human Resources Manager
associated such negative stereotypes with locks and/or that she was
instructed to exclusively regulate locks adorned by African descendants. Indeed, it appears that CMS only instructed Black applicants
who wore locks to cut off their hair as a condition of employment.227
Relatedly, the court foreclosed the EEOC’s opportunity to uncover
evidence concerning the enforcement of the human resources manager’s “propensity to have messy hair standard.” In other words, was
this subjective standard exclusively applied to Black applicants
and/or employees, or did all employees or applicants—regardless of
their race—have to cut their hair if a CMS representative perceived
it as having a propensity to become messy? 228 If the EEOC uncovered the former during discovery, this would be quintessential evidence to support a claim of intentional race discrimination.229 The

225

Id. at 4.
See generally, Greene, What’s Hair, supra note 84, at 1387–88 (discussing
how African descendants’ natural hair is often referred to in derogatory terms like
“nappy” or “kinky,” perceived as “unclean” or often times associated with criminality).
227
Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 2016 WL 7210059 at 11.
228
In Burdine, the Supreme Court emphasized that the plaintiff is allowed to
liberally engage in discovery in order to sustain her burden of persuasion in a Title
VII intentional discrimination case. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981) (internal citation omitted) (“the liberal discovery rules
applicable to any civil suit in federal court are supplemented in a Title VII suit by
the plaintiff’s access to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s investigatory files concerning her complaint. . . [A Title VII] plaintiff will find it particularly difficult to prove that a proffered explanation lacking a factual basis is a
pretext”).
229
It appears that the court might have held that EEOC put forth a plausible
claim of intentional race discrimination had the EEOC alleged that CMS applied
the grooming policy more favorably toward white applicants and employees than
Black applicants and employees. See EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 837
F. 3d 1156 (11th Cir. 2016), withdrawn and superseded by, No. 14-13482, 2016
WL 72120059 at 11 (11th Cir. Dec. 13, 2016). (court explaining that evidence of
226
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EEOC might have uncovered rare evidence that white applicants or
employees who wore locks were not instructed to remove them as a
condition of employment. This evidence, too, would support a claim
of intentional race discrimination. Lastly, the EEOC could have also
discovered that CMS’ motivation behind the “neutral” policy was to
regulate the display of African descendants’ natural hairstyles such
as locks. All of this evidence would undoubtedly substantiate a
claim of intentional race discrimination. Notably, however, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the EEOC’s complaint failed to state a
claim of intentional race discrimination, implying it was unsuccessful since the EEOC did not allege “that dreadlocks are an immutable
characteristic of black persons.”230 As a result, the Eleventh Circuit’s exacting application of the immutability doctrine led the court
to affirm the district court’s untenable declaration: any attempt on
the part of the EEOC to prove intentional race discrimination would
be “futile.”231
C. A More Expansive Notion of Immutability: An Avenue to
Freeing Black Women’s Hair?
After the Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion, the EEOC filed a
petition for rehearing en banc232 and amici also filed a brief in support of the EEOC’s petition.233 Appreciating immutability’s stronghold in anti-discrimination jurisprudence and its consequences,
amici urged the court to adopt a more expansive notion of immuta-

uneven enforcement of a grooming policy can demonstrate intentional discrimination).
230
Id. at 11 n.2 (court explaining that evidence of uneven enforcement of a
grooming policy can demonstrate intentional discrimination).
231
Id. at 13.
232
Petition for Rehearing En Banc, EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions,
No. 14-13482, (11th Cir. Oct. 31, 2016). It is important to note that at the time of
this article’s publication the Eleventh Circuit had not issued a decision regarding
the EEOC’s petition for rehearing.
233
See generally Brief for NAACP et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, No. 14-13482 (11th Cir. Dec. 28,
2016). Professor Angela Onwuachi-Willig and I joined the NAACP-Legal Defense Fund and the Legal Aid Society—Employment Law Center to file this amicus brief.
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bility which federal courts have applied in constitutional cases challenging sexual orientation discrimination.234 In these cases, courts
permitted sexual orientation discrimination claims based upon the
concept that immutability embodies characteristics that are “central
and fundamental” to one’s identity; therefore, the Constitution guarantees protection against discrimination when one is “required to
abandon” such a characteristic.235 Amici also argued that in Obergefell v. Hodges, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the
Fourteenth Amendment to guarantee a parallel protection against
discrimination based upon “personal choices central to individual
dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”236 Therefore, in determining whether to
dispense statutory protection, amici pressed the Eleventh Circuit to
shift its query from “whether a person could change a particular
characteristic” to “whether the characteristic is something that the
person should be required to change” because of its centrality to her
identity.237 Though not perfect,238 judicial application of this more
expansive notion of immutability—which some legal scholars have
coined the “new immutability,”239 “personhood” immutability,240
234

Id. at 26–28. See also generally Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability,
125 YALE L.J. 2, 23-27 (2015).
235
See id. (citing to Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294,
326 (D. Conn. 2012)).
236
See id, at 13-14 (citing to Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, slip op. at 10
(2015).
237
See id. (citing to Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1013 (W.D. Wisc.
2014).
238
See Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 11 (2015)
(critiquing the “new immutability” as a unifying concept across employment discrimination law, as it does not cure the difficulty of distinguishing between which
characteristics are central to one’s personhood and those that are not and it could
continue to justify only limited forms of statutory protection like strict immutability).
239
See generally Clarke, id. (in passim).
240
Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility
Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, 108 YALE L.J. 485, 494
(1998) (explaining that the Ninth Circuit in Watkins v. United States Army “distinguished among three different kinds of immutability—’strict’ immutability, in
which the bearer must be unable to change the trait; ’effective’ immutability, in
which changing the trait is possible but difficult; and ‘personhood’ immutability,
in which the bearer’s ability to change the trait is irrelevant, as long as it is central
to her identity) (citing Watkins v. United States Army 837 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir.),
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and “soft immutability”241—would bring about a seismic, yet feasible (and warranted) change in positionality in race-based grooming
codes discrimination cases. It would require courts to acknowledge
fully the contentions of African descendants like Renee Rodgers and
Chastity Jones that their hair texture and the ways in which it grows
and is styled are central to their personhood as Black women, rather
than dismissing or refuting their claims.242 As a result, it may cause
judges to pause before supplanting Black women’s understanding of
their hair with their own judgments. Moreover, courts may come to
better appreciate the indignity of employers compelling Black
women to cut, alter, or cover their natural hair as a condition of employment.
CONCLUSION
Naturally, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions generated swift and massive media attention.243 It has been well documented that informal and formal
grooming policies present a unique yet ubiquitous barrier to employability and professional advancement for Black women.244 For

amended by 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated and aff’d on other
grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
241
See, e.g., Joseph Landau, ”Soft Immutability” and “Imputed Gay Identity”: Recent Developments in Transgender and Sexual-Orientation-Based Asylum Law, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 237, 263 (2005).
242
See Part II.B. (discussing how the court in Rogers v. American Airlines
dismissed Ms. Rodgers’ claim that her cornrows played an essential role in her
personhood and self-understanding as a Black woman in parallel ways that donning a hijab for some Muslim women plays a defining role in both the external
signification and subjective understanding of their religious identity).
243
See, e.g., Matt Fernandez, Federal Appeals court upholds ruling in dreadlock workplace lawsuit, WIAT (Sept. 24, 2016, 8:23 PM),
http://wiat.com/2016/09/24/federal-appeals-court-upholds-ruling-in-dreadlockworkplace-lawsuit/; Jacob Gershman, Appeals Court: Employees Don’t Have a
Right to Wear Dreadlocks, WALL ST. J.: L. BLOG (Sept. 16, 2016, 2:29 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/09/16/appeals-court-employees-dont-have-aright-to-wear-dreadlocks/; Victoria M. Massie, Federal appeals court rules it’s
okay to discriminate against black hairstyles like dreadlocks, VOX (Sept. 19,
2016, 5:00 PM), http://www.vox.com/2016/9/19/12971790/court-discriminatedreadlocks.
244
See generally id.
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many Black women, altering one’s natural hair, or rather, maintaining straightened hair is an explicit or implicit term or condition of
employment. This article makes clear that the Eleventh Circuit’s
opinion maintains this status quo and exacerbates the hyper-regulation of Black women’s bodies via their hair. The Eleventh Circuit’s
premature dismissal of the EEOC’s grooming codes discrimination
case shields covered employers from Title VII liability even where
they may have engaged in textbook intentional race discrimination,
as it legitimizes barring complainants from engaging in discovery in
grooming codes cases not involving afros. The Eleventh Circuit’s
early dismissal of the EEOC’s case also insulates covered employers
who ban African descendant women from donning their naturally
textured hair—when not shaped like an afro—as long they are acting
pursuant to a formal or an informal grooming policy that expects
“professional” or “business-like” hairstyles. Moreover, the panel’s
enhanced version of strict immutability and the race-immutability/culture-mutability distinction makes it impossible for race discrimination plaintiffs to challenge discrimination against mutable
characteristics despite their nexus to race. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit’s hair splitting decision amplified nearly forty years of federal
precedent permitting the lawful deprivation of employment opportunities for which African descendant women are qualified alongside their equal inclusion, dignity, and privileges of employment
when they grow their unstraightened, naturally textured hair long or
when their hair does not perfectly resemble an afro.

